Wars, nation and the welfare state in Finland by Kettunen, Pauli Tapio
 
Final manuscript of chapter in Herbert Obinger, Klaus Petersen & Peter 
Starke (eds.) Warfare and Welfare. Military Conflict and Welfare State 
Development in Western Countries. Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2018, 260-289. 
 
Wars, Nation, and the Welfare State in Finland 
Pauli Kettunen 
 
Abstract and Keywords 
In public constructions of the national past in Finland, two major 
themes currently predominate: the wars of the twentieth century, 
including the Civil War of 1918 and the wars against the Soviet Union 
during World War II, and the making of a Nordic welfare state. The 
chapter takes the current intertwining of these national narratives as a 
point of departure for analysing the social policy role of wars in 
Finland. It examines direct and indirect impacts of experienced or 
anticipated wars, short-term and long-term social policy measures and 
outcomes, and institutional continuities and discontinuities. The paper 
discusses the ways wars have shaped the notion of national agency as 
a framework of social policies, and identifies multi-layered historical 
legacies of wars in the making of the welfare state post-World War II. 
Keywords:  war, welfare state, national agency, civil war, social 
cohesion, rational planning, population policy, Finland, Nordic welfare 
state 
 
Introduction 
 
In public constructions of the national past in Finland, two major 
themes currently predominate: the wars of the twentieth century and 
the making of a Nordic welfare state. Sometimes they represent rival 
ideas about the historical core of national agency, but they also 
intertwine. This paper takes the current intertwining of these national 
narratives as a point of departure for analysing the social policy role of 
wars in Finland. From this perspective, the paper also discusses Finland 
as a specific case within the history of Nordic welfare states. 
The dominant public narrative of the making of the Finnish welfare 
state includes the reconciled confrontation of the Civil War of 1918 
 
between the socialist Reds and the bourgeois Whites. It also involves 
images and legacies of national integration during World War II, when 
Finland was involved in two wars against the Soviet Union: the Winter 
War of 1939–40 and the Continuation War of 1941–4, as well as the 
Lapland War of 1944–5 to expel German troops, ‘the brothers in arms’ 
of the preceding Continuation War. In political debates, ‘the spirit of 
the Winter War’ is often referred to for revitalizing Finnish potential to 
unite in defence of what are seen as joint national achievements. The 
welfare state currently appears as such an achievement, and rescuing 
the welfare state is an argument for a wide range of political objectives, 
including those of austerity politics. 
The rhetoric associating wars with national agency and with the welfare 
state can refer to real experiences and memories. The casualties of the 
Civil War of 1918—including those 12,000 Reds who died in prison 
camps after the war— amounted to about 38,000 people killed. In 
World War II, about 700,000 men served as soldiers; of these, 93,000 
soldiers and 2,000 civilians died, and about 95,000 soldiers were 
permanently disabled. The population of the territories ceded to the 
Soviet Union (more than 400,000 people) was relocated within the rest 
of Finland. In 1940, the population of Finland was 3.7 million. The 
political system and the international position of the country were 
profoundly affected by the experiences and outcomes of wars, which 
influenced the definition of social problems and solutions, and political 
battles over the right ways to define and solve social problems. 
Wars have influenced social policies by destroying and damaging 
human life and by changing economic and social conditions, that is, 
through their direct impact on what can and must be ‘constructed’ as 
social problems (cf. Spector and Kitsuse 2011). However, the impacts 
of wars on social policies have also been mediated through the role they 
have played in the formation and transformation of the nation state, and 
national polity and its different actors. Wars have affected the 
relationship between ‘the space of experience’ and ‘the horizon of 
expectation’ (Koselleck 1979) in national politics and policies. Thus, 
they have shaped the institutional and ideational frameworks for 
defining and solving social problems. 
The notion of external challenges and an internal national will 
responding to those challenges is an ingredient of nationalism, 
especially in small countries. Finland is one of those countries in which 
the threats, experiences, and outcomes of wars have significantly 
 
contributed to this mode of thought and action. It reveals itself in the 
intertwining of the welfare state and wars in current national narratives. 
These consensual narratives are far from sustainable as historical 
interpretations, but they reflect an important war-related ideational 
aspect in the development of Finnish social policies, that is, a concern 
about the agency of the nation in the world of external challenges and 
necessities. 
This chapter is structured in three parts, corresponding to three periods. 
Each part takes into account the direct and indirect impacts of 
experienced or anticipated wars, short-term and long-term policy 
measures and outcomes, and institutional continuities and 
discontinuities. The first part encompasses a period of one hundred 
years from the beginning of nineteenth century until the first years of 
twentieth century. It includes three wars that played a crucial role in 
the making of Finland: the Russo-Swedish War of 1808–9, the Crimean 
War of 1853–6 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5. In the second 
part, the experiences and outcomes of World War I and the Civil War 
of 1918 are examined. The third part of the chapter focuses on World 
War II as a significant phase in the processes combining social policies 
with concerns about national agency. From this perspective, the role of 
wartime experiences and the outcomes of the war in post-war social 
policies are also discussed. The conclusion identifies multi-layered 
historical legacies of wars in the post-World War II transformations 
that we, from our modern-day perspective, may call the making of the 
welfare state, and the focus is, as it is in the chapter in general, on how 
wars have shaped the notion of national agency as a framework of 
social policymaking. 
 
Wars in the Making of Finland and its Social Question 
 
Sweden lost its Eastern provinces in the Russo-Swedish War of 1808–
9, linked with the Napoleonic Wars, and they were reshaped as the 
Grand Duchy of Finland of the Russian Empire. In the nineteenth 
century, the Grand Duchy developed into an autonomous nation state. 
In the borderlands of the Russian Empire, old Swedish legal and 
religious (Lutheran) institutions and traditions persisted, utilized by, 
and intertwined with, the new Finnish nationalism that was largely 
compatible with the Russian imperial interest of promoting the 
separation of Finland from Sweden. 
 
The conclusions drawn by the new Emperor Alexander II from the 
experiences of the Crimean War of 1853–6 launched a period of 
reforms in the empire. In the loyal Grand Duchy of Finland, the old 
Swedish Four-Estate (nobility, clergy, burghers, farmers) Diet was 
reintroduced in 1863—the year of the Polish uprising against the 
Russian Empire that led to Poland losing its autonomy. Space for 
political debate and civic organization opened up in the 1860s. ‘The 
people’ emerged in the debates of the political elite as a target for 
education and ‘national awakening’ and as the source of political 
legitimacy. Conflicts tended to be shaped as struggles for the right way 
and the privilege to speak in the name of ‘the people’. This was evident 
in the controversies between the so-called Fennomans and the so-called 
Liberals from the 1860s onwards, concerning the role of language, 
culture, and constitution in the making of the nation, and it was also 
characteristic of later political conflicts concerning the right ways of 
defending Finland’s autonomy and the handling of social class 
divisions (Alapuro 1988; Klinge 1993; Pulkkinen 1999). 
Economic reforms in the 1860s and 1870s removed mercantilist 
privileges and regulations, and were completed by further reforms that 
gradually realized the principle of a free labour market. Accordingly, 
the Bill of Poor Relief was revised in 1879 in accordance with the 
liberalist work-discipline spirit of the English Poor Law of 1834, 
imported to Finland via the Swedish Bill of Poor Relief that had been 
revised a few years earlier. Poor relief and care of the sick were the 
responsibility of municipalities that were, in 1865, separated from the 
parishes of the Lutheran Church. At that time, Finland was a poor rural 
country in which extreme natural conditions imposed major economic 
constraints. The last nationwide famine, in 1866–8, and the diseases 
associated with it, killed approximately 150,000 people, about 8 per 
cent of population (Häkkinen and Forsberg 2015). 
In a small country like Finland which, even by Nordic standards, was 
late to industrialize, international comparisons came to play a 
prominent role in the definition of social problems and solutions. From 
the second half of the nineteenth century onwards, such comparisons 
became integral to the way the educated elite analysed society and 
defined socio-political tasks. It was a question not only of imitating 
more developed countries but also of deliberately attempting to 
anticipate social problems by taking on board experiences from ‘more 
civilized’ countries. One may characterize this mode of thought and 
 
action as the avantgardism of the intellectual elite of a peripheral 
country. For this pattern of thought, the outside world provided a 
framework of external preconditions and constraints, hopes and threats, 
intriguing but also alarming ideas, examples of both model and 
unpleasant societal arrangements, and opportunities to be grasped as 
well as necessities to be responded to. 
A long period of time often elapsed between the definition of a social 
problem and its solution, with the help of imported ideas on the one 
hand and the practical application of these definitions and solutions on 
the other. However, as early as the 1880s and 1890s, when the far from 
democratic system of the Estates still operated, and there was no labour 
movement proper, two acts of principal importance were adopted: the 
Act on the Protection of Industrial Workers, which established the 
institution of factory inspection (1889), and the Workers’ 
Compensation Act (1895). Finland was not a laggard when it came to 
the statutory regulation of industrial work—indeed it was not even a 
latecomer among the Nordic countries. Thus, for example, the adoption 
of a special female factory inspectorate was launched in Finland in 
1903, ten years earlier than in Sweden (Kettunen 1994, 32–91; 
Kettunen 2001b, 233). 
The state was the central agent in the integration of Finland in 
expanding industrial capitalism, as it was in other Nordic countries too. 
Bureaucratic interest in increasing state revenues motivated market-
promoting reforms, and political and economic elites adopted a state-
centred image of a national economy that from the 1860s had its own 
currency, customs, and state railways. The latter provided an important 
infrastructure for Finnish nation-building, while also strengthening the 
connection of the Grand Duchy to the capital of the Russian Empire, 
Sankt Petersburg, and also playing a role in Russian military plans 
(Polvinen 1962). As a result of the infrastructural role of the state, a 
considerable part of what can be called the ‘aristocracy of labour’, for 
example locomotive drivers, had the formal status of civil servants and 
corresponding social benefits, including pensions (Kettunen 1976). 
Indicative of the autonomous status of the Grand Duchy, a Finnish 
Army, separate from the Russian Army, was founded in 1878. It was 
based on general conscription by ballot, with a peacetime strength of 
5,600 men. In 1901, the Russian government decided to extend the 
empire’s conscription system to Finland and to dissolve the separate 
Finnish Army. Because of Finnish resistance, however, the 
 
introduction of imperial conscription in Finland largely failed. In 1905, 
the Russian government backed down on this attempt, and instead of 
imperial conscription, the Grand Duchy was obliged to contribute 
financially to the costs of the Russian Army (Screen 1996). 
Conscription was a major issue in the conflict that emerged between 
the Finnish polity and the Russian Empire at the turn of the century. It 
was a collision between the consolidation of Finland as an autonomous 
political, economic, and cultural unit, and the Russian effort to promote 
a stronger administrative unity of its empire. However, imperial 
integration policies temporarily lost much of their force, as the Russian 
Empire was weakened by its defeats in the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904–5. This had longstanding consequences for Finnish polity and 
society. In connection with revolutionary turmoil in Russia, a 
breakthrough of mass politics and the labour movement took place in 
Finland. After the General Strike of 1905, representation through the 
Estates was suddenly replaced by the most democratic representative 
system in Europe. Even though restricted by the re-established 
authority of the emperor, after 1906 Finland had a political system 
based on a universal franchise that included women (Jussila 1999, 79–
91). 
National integration in terms of increased cultural homogeneity 
(Alapuro 1988, 92–110) greatly contributed to the development of 
class conflicts. The nation as ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983) 
provided socially subordinated groups with criteria for a critique of 
prevailing circumstances and with a frame of reference within which 
they could politically interpret and generalize their local experiences of 
injustice. In one of the most rural countries of Europe, one of the—in 
relative terms—largest labour movements in the world emerged. The 
strength of the Finnish labour movement was based on its success in 
creating an alliance between urban workers and rural landless workers 
and tenant peasants. Reflecting this background, the Social Democratic 
Party was considerably larger than the trade unions in quantitative, 
social, and territorial terms. 
The discourse of the ‘social question’ included several ‘questions’: a 
‘labour question’, a ‘tenant question’, and a ‘landless population 
question’. Often the concept of a labour question referred to all urban 
and rural social problems and divides. Conflicts between the Socialists 
and the bourgeois parties were evident, yet social policy reforms were, 
in varying ways and with divergent intentions, included in the 
 
programmes of all parties. Laws concerning labour protection, 
regulation of labour relations, and unemployment funds were legislated 
by parliament (Eduskunta) before World War I. However, only a very 
few of them were implemented as the legislative power of parliament 
was restricted by the authority of the Russian Emperor, who frequently 
refused to confirm an act. 
 
World War I, the Civil War, and Divergent Visions of Social Peace 
 
World War I in Finland 
 
Through the connection with Russia, World War I greatly affected 
Finnish society and economy. The war was experienced as an extended 
presence of Russian military units; restrictions on civic activities by the 
imposition of martial law; reorganization of industrial production to 
serve the needs of Russian warfare; large fortification works and 
associated labour mobility, and vast unemployment after the end of 
these works; accelerating inflation; and finally the shortage of food. 
Particular ‘war taxes’ were introduced without obtaining parliamentary 
consent that was normally required for decisions on taxation 
(Linnakangas 2015). 
However, Finland did not directly become a World War I battlefield 
and the Finns also avoided compulsory service in the Russian Army. 
There were, however, Finnish officers who had made their careers in 
Russia, Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim being the most famous example. 
After the beginning of World War I, Finnish volunteers joined both the 
Russian Army and the German Army: 700 in the former and 2,000 in 
the latter. The young men joining the German Army were mobilized 
through a clandestine organization of antiRussian activists. After 
returning to Finland at the beginning of 1918, these Jägers, who were 
prepared to battle against the Russians, came to form the core officer 
group of the White Army in the Civil War—under Commander-in-
Chief Mannerheim, a general in the Russian Army who had returned to 
Finland after the revolution. 
Parliament was not permitted to assemble in the early years of World 
War I. Parliamentary elections were, however, arranged in 1916, and 
for the first time the Social Democratic Party gained a majority, 
winning 103 seats out of a possible 200. Parliament met again after the 
 
Russian February Revolution in 1917, and a national coalition 
government of socialists and the bourgeois parties was formed. The 
head of government came from the Social Democratic Party. 
A very rapid mobilization of workers in trade unions took place in the 
spring of 1917. A traditional key objective of the international labour 
movement, the eight-hour working day, proved to have particular 
mobilizing power. Many trade unions had already compelled 
employers to accept this norm before parliament passed the Act on 
Eight-Hour Working Day. Some of the social policy edicts that 
parliament had accepted before World War I were confirmed after the 
February Revolution: an act extending workers accident insurance and 
another regulating and supporting voluntary unemployment funds.  
Soon after the formation of the socialist-led coalition government it 
became obvious that the economic and social situation was worsening. 
Less grain could be imported from Russia, leading to a shortage of 
food; inflation accelerated; and mass unemployment emerged as 
fortification works ended (Haapala 2014). 
Yet, as the Finnish sociologist Risto Alapuro (1988, 150–60) points 
out, these socio-economic troubles were not uniquely Finnish and 
cannot explain why a civil war began less than one year after the 
national cross-class enthusiasm of the spring of 1917. In order to 
understand this, we must pay attention to two major questions that 
emerged after the February Revolution. One was the question of what 
body would assume supreme authority after the emperor ceased to rule, 
and the other concerned the organization of the coercive power of 
internal order and security after the replacement of a police force that 
had been largely ‘Russified’ in previous years. In the context of World 
War I, and closely linked with different phases of the Russian 
Revolution, these two unresolved questions gave impetus to the 
conflicts that resulted in a confrontation between two armed political 
forces that emerged in a weakly coordinated fashion on the basis of the 
earlier established class-based political divide. 
 
The Civil War 
 
A decisive turn occurred between July and August 1917. The Social 
Democrats, aiming to extend national autonomy and to raise parliament 
to a dominant position in the political system, pushed through the so-
 
called law on authority. The law left only foreign policy and military 
affairs in the sphere of authority of the provisional government of 
Russia and proclaimed the full internal autonomy of Finland. The 
provisional government was unwilling to concede this and dissolved 
parliament with support from bourgeois groups. This also meant the 
end of coalition government. The Social Democrats did not recognize 
the dissolution of parliament, but nevertheless self-confidently 
participated in the new election in October 1917, and shockingly lost 
their majority. While still participating in parliamentary work, the 
Social Democrats did not fully recognize the legitimacy of the 
decisions made by the new parliament and the bourgeois government. 
At the same time, the radicalized mass of workers, in part together with 
Russian soldiers still remaining in Finland, formed a force to a large 
extent outside of the Socialist leaders’ control (Upton 1980; Siltala 
2014). 
After the October Revolution, the achievement of full national 
sovereignty became an urgent issue for all Finnish parties. For the 
Social Democrats, the decisive factor was that the Bolsheviks, now in 
power, had been the only party in Russia that had declared willingness 
to approve Finland’s independence, whereas, among the bourgeois 
groups, the fear of Socialist revolution urged the separation from 
Russia. In December 1917, Finland was declared independent and the 
Bolshevik government recognized this independence. This did not, 
however, prevent the escalation of political confrontation into a full-
scale civil war at the end of January 1918, with the left forming a Red 
government and assuming revolutionary power. 
Decision-making in the Social Democratic Party and other working-
class organizations prior to the abortive revolution was confused and 
fragmented, and there were controversies about the legitimacy of an 
armed revolution; yet only a few leading Social Democrats eventually 
declined to participate and no one joined the opposing side. The notion 
of defending the progressive course of history that had been reversed 
by the events of July and August 1917 contributed to the legitimacy of 
the decision. Bolshevist influences and encouragement played a role, 
but it was only after the total defeat of the revolution that the labour 
movement was divided into Social Democrats and Communists. 
The Red government was formed by leaders of Social Democratic 
Party and trade unions, and it dominated Southern Finland and the 
largest cities. The bourgeois government had fled to Ostrobothnia, a 
 
province of independent farmers with their own particular political and 
cultural traditions, which became the stronghold of the White Finland 
mobilization and, later, of the White legacy of the Civil War. The 
strength of both sides, the Red Guards and the White Guards, was about 
80,000 troops. The Red Guards, a poorly trained army with hardly any 
military expertise, received arms from Russia and were assisted by 
Russian soldiers; however, the withdrawal of Russian troops from 
Finland was continuing and the peace treaty between Soviet Russia and 
Germany in March 1918 further diminished this source of support. The 
White government, in turn, received support from Germany, which not 
only trained the Finnish Jägers but also sent to Finland a first-rate 
military unit, the Baltic Division, which played a significant role in the 
last phase of the war. The German troops conquered Helsinki in April, 
and on 16 May 1918 a victory parade of the White Army, led by 
General Mannerheim, marched through the city. 
Among the 38,000 casualties of the Civil War, about 10,000 died in 
battle; the rest were killed in executions outside of military engagement 
and in prison camps after the war. Seventy-five per cent of casualties 
were on the Red side. Social policies concerning invalids, widows, and 
orphans were spoils of the victors. Soon after the Civil War, a law on 
pensions was passed for those wounded or those having lost a provider 
on the White side. Until World War II, war invalids on the Red side 
were only eligible for support through poor relief, and one of the ways 
of assisting Red orphans was to send them to be re-educated in 
Ostrobothnian White farmer families (Kaarninen 2008). However, 
assistance for Red widows and orphans was a focus of labour 
movement activities after the Civil War (Saarela 2014). 
 
Strategies of Social Peace 
 
Despite the counter-revolutionary outcome of the Civil War, Finland 
was, by the constitution of 1919, established as a parliamentary 
republic. Again, this solution had its antecedents in international 
transformations. The alliance of the White winners with the German 
Empire lost its basis when Germany not only lost World War I but 
when the empire itself was also dissolved through revolution. In 
Finland, the parliamentary form of democracy persisted throughout the 
1920s and 1930s, even though it was threatened and limited by right-
 
wing pressure, especially in the early 1930s. The persistence of 
democratic forms made Finland exceptional among the new nation 
states created through the collapse of multi-ethnic empires at the end 
of World War I. Any explanation of this exceptionality must recognize 
that Nordic political traditions had played a crucial role in Finnish 
nation building. 
However, the outcomes and memories of the Civil War became an 
integral part of social, political, and cultural structures. Thus, the 
Whites controlled military power in the army and in the vast, semi-
official paramilitary Civil Guards organization. The White legacy of 
the Civil War, including a view of Russia and the Soviet Union as the 
enemy to be sooner or later confronted in a war, was mediated through 
military education in an army that was based on general conscription. 
Through conscription, this legacy also became an ingredient of the 
ideal of masculine citizenship. At the same time, general conscription 
implied the need for strategies for national integration and popular 
legitimation of the regime, as a great many of the conscripts came from 
families with Red-side experiences and memories (Ahlbäck 2014). 
To the White winners of the Civil War, the free landowning peasant 
became the symbol of the White Army as the antithesis of the harmful 
Red alliance between urban workers and the rural, landless population. 
A free independent peasantry also constituted the ideological centre 
around which ‘social peace’ had to be ‘rebuilt’ and defended against 
the threats associated with the collectivism of wage earners (Kettunen 
1997, 103–24). On the basis of previous plans, land reforms were 
carried out rapidly after the Civil War. These reforms ‘liberated’ 
tenants, transforming them into landowning small-scale farmers, and 
facilitated the colonization of the landless, rural proletariat. The mode 
of thought and action according to which social peace should be based 
on political democracy and an independent freeholder peasantry as the 
core of the nation, was especially characteristic of the Agrarian Party, 
which gained a powerful position in the political system in the 1920s. 
However, efforts to foster national reconciliation after the Civil War 
also included legislative reforms concerning industrial working life. 
Politicians and civil servants representing social liberal traditions took 
up earlier plans of regulating individual employment contracts and 
collective interest conflicts. Inspiration was taken from a new 
international organization that was designed to combine the objectives 
of international peace and social peace, the International Labour 
 
Organization (ILO), founded in 1919 as an autonomous part of the 
League of Nations and as Versailles’ answer to Bolshevism. This 
labour peace orientation was also inspired by Nordic cooperation, not 
least in the wider context of ILO activities (Petersen 2006; Kettunen 
2013). 
In the early 1920s, parliament passed acts on employment contracts 
(1922), collective agreements (1924), and the mediation and arbitration 
of industrial conflicts (1925). These reforms were designed to facilitate 
a shift towards a comprehensive regulation of labour relations by 
collective agreements between trade unions and employers. However, 
this vision was not realized prior to World War II, as employers, 
especially those in the wood processing, textile, and other 
manufacturing industries, successfully adhered to a policy rejecting 
collective agreement whilst utilizing repressive, ideological, and 
paternalist company welfare means against trade union influence. The 
ideology that made ‘the will to work’ of the independent farmer the 
core of social peace provided ideological legitimization for the policy 
of industrial employers. 
Labour law reforms were not costly. A far more expensive social 
reform, also motivated by the integrative conclusions drawn from the 
Civil War, was that of compulsory education. The act was passed in 
1922, and it increased the responsibilities of municipalities in which 
decision-making had been democratized by the legislative reform in 
1917. The new Bill for Poor Relief of 1922 included more modest 
changes in current municipal practices. Taxation was reformed in the 
early 1920s at state and municipality levels, and the principle of 
progressivity was implemented by a law of 1920 in the state-level 
taxation of income (Lindberg 1934; Linnakangas 2015). 
Discussion and planning for social insurance had begun in the 1880s, 
but before the 1920s only workers’ accident insurance had been 
introduced (1895) and then extended (1917). The first act regulating 
and facilitating voluntary funds was passed in 1897, with a focus on 
sickness provision. In 1917, an act permitting voluntary unemployment 
funds established by trade unions was passed, an embryo of the so-
called Ghent System in Finland. In post-Civil War debates on options 
to extend social insurance, the relative priority of sickness insurance 
and old-age insurance became an issue of dispute. While the sickness 
insurance of wage earners was the first priority of the Social 
Democrats, the Agrarian Party disliked social benefits that were 
 
targeted only at wage earners, and it put old-age and disability 
insurance before sickness insurance. After much debate, the Old-Age 
and Disability Insurance Scheme was legislated in 1937, after 
compromises between the coalition partners of the new government, 
the Social Democrats and the Agrarian Party. An act on sickness 
insurance did not become law until 1963 (Kettunen 2001b). 
 Labour Movement in a Post-Civil War Nordic Country After the 
abortive revolution, the Finnish labour movement was divided between 
Social Democrats and Communists. The Communist Party of Finland 
was illegal until 1944, and its leaders, the former heads of the Red 
government of 1918, lived in exile in the Soviet Union. Most were 
killed in Stalin’s purges in the late 1930s. In the 1920s, the Communists 
and their sympathizers nevertheless had opportunities to act in public 
labour organizations, most notably in the trade union movement (in 
which they held leading positions in the 1920s) and even in parliament. 
In 1930, those categorized as Communists were excluded from public 
political arenas. In terms of electoral support, the Social Democratic 
Party was still the largest political party in Finland in the 1920s and 
1930s. However, in different ways, both major wings of the labour 
movement were preconditioned by the post-Civil War regime, which 
did not provide a favourable context for comprehensive political 
projects that would include less than the goal of a socialist society but 
more than particular piecemeal social policy reforms. 
Support for the labour movement in Finnish parliamentary elections in 
the 1920s and the late 1930s was at the ‘Nordic’ level, close to 40 per 
cent, but it was unthinkable that the Social Democrats could have 
achieved a leading position in defining the political agenda in the same 
manner as in other Nordic countries in the 1930s. This remained true 
after World War II. The Social Democrats faced the Communists as 
their fierce rivals in the labour movement after the Civil War and more 
so after the Continuation War when the Communist Party gained a 
legal status. The Agrarian Party (from 1965, the Centre Party) played 
a central role in the political system and in social policies after World 
War II, both as an opponent and as a coalition partner of working-class 
parties. Agricultural policies were closely connected with social 
policies; these were two policy sectors that partly represented 
competing views on the problems of social order. And until the 1960s, 
the power of cultural conservatism still reflected the heritage of the 
 
counter-revolutionary White victory in 1918, a continuity that was far 
from totally broken by the post-World War II political changes. 
‘Nordic’ was an attribute of Finnish society, but its meaning was a 
matter of political contestation, partly as a result of conflicts 
concerning the position of the Swedish language in Finland, but also 
because of a charge following the confrontation of the Civil War. In 
the White heritage of the Civil War, ‘Nordic’ was associated with the 
idealized tradition of the free Nordic peasant and local community, 
whereas for the Social Democrats ‘Nordic’ in the 1930s began to 
represent democracy, in contrast to authoritarian regimes and the 
prevailing state of industrial relations in Finland. The concept of 
Nordic democracy, as it was defined in the cooperative undertakings of 
Nordic Social Democrats in the 1930s (Kurunmäki 2011), included a 
combination of parliamentary political democracy and institutions of 
collective negotiation and agreement in labour markets. The argument 
of the Social Democratic trade union leaders in the 1930s was that, 
while Finland was a Nordic society, it did not fulfil the criteria of the 
Nordic democracy (Kettunen 2006, 56–9). 
In any case, for the development of the notion of Finland as a Nordic 
democracy, the coalition of the Social Democratic Party and the 
Agrarian Party in the late 1930s was important. This Scandinavian-type 
coalition of ‘the worker and the farmer’ crossed the boundaries of the 
1918 Red/White conflict and contributed to national integration and the 
stabilization of parliamentary democracy—although the limits of 
democracy were marked by the illegality of the Communist Party until 
1944. The so-called Nordic orientation of the Finnish foreign policy in 
the late 1930s became associated with ‘Nordic democracy’, a way of 
defining Finland’s position in a world of threatened democracy and the 
increasing danger of war. 
 
World War II: National Agency and Wartime Questions 
 
Finland in World War II 
 
In October 1939, after preceding diplomatic messages to Finland in 
1938/9, the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939, and the British 
and French declarations of war on Germany after its invasion of 
Poland, the Soviet Union invited representatives of Finland to negotiate 
 
in Moscow. The Soviet leaders demanded a territory exchange that 
would push the Finnish–Soviet border farther from Leningrad. They 
also wanted to obtain a military base on the northern coast of the Gulf 
of Finland. The Finnish response did not meet Soviet demands, and the 
Soviet military offensive started on 30 November 1939. 
The Finnish resistance proved stronger than Stalin had expected, both 
militarily and in terms of national unity. The Winter War was an event 
of great international interest during the otherwise relatively 
undramatic first winter of World War II. The war ended in March 1940. 
About 27,000 Finns were killed; the number of Soviet casualties was 
much higher. Finland ceded one fifth of its territory to the Soviet Union 
as well as a naval base on the Gulf of Finland. The treaty did not require 
the Finnish population to leave the ceded territory, but practically the 
entire population chose to relocate. About 410,000 Finnish Karelians, 
or 12 per cent of Finland’s population, were relocated to other areas of 
Finland. During the Continuation War of 1941–4 most of the displaced 
population returned to Karelia, but in summer 1944 they were 
evacuated again. 
After the Winter War, Finnish political decision-making was 
influenced by further Soviet pressures, fears caused by the Soviet 
annexation of the Baltic countries, and the desire to reclaim what had 
been lost in the Winter War, partly inspired by right-wing nationalist 
visions of a Great Finland that would extend to Eastern Karelia (which 
had never before belonged to Finland). After the summer 1940, Finland 
gradually aligned more closely with Germany, and in the spring of 
1941, the Finnish military joined the German military in planning for 
the invasion of the Soviet Union. In late June 1941, Finland was once 
again at war with the Soviet Union. 
The war was described as the Continuation War, implying that it was a 
defensive continuation of the Winter War with a distinctly Finnish–
Soviet rationale; yet Finland was now in fact in alliance with Nazi 
Germany and contributing to Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa. In the 
offensive phase, Finnish troops proceeded to the East, far beyond the 
country’s old border, and occupied Eastern Karelia. After the German 
defeat at Stalingrad, Finnish political and military leaders began to seek 
a way out of the war. The powerful Soviet offensive in June 1944 urged 
a solution. In September, an armistice treaty was signed between 
Finland, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, which in 1941 had 
also declared war on Finland, although without subsequent military 
 
action. A most urgent feature of the treaty was a focus on expelling 
German forces from Finland: there were 213,000 troops in Northern 
Finland at that time. The so-called Lapland War began in September 
1944 and ended in April 1945, when all German troops had withdrawn. 
The control commission of the Allies, dominated by the Soviet Union, 
controlled the implementation of the armistice treaty until its 
conditions were confirmed by the final Peace Treaty of Paris 1947. 
However, Finland was one of the few countries participating in World 
War II to have never been occupied. 
The number of Finns killed in the Continuation War exceeded 65,000; 
in the Lapland War the number was less than 1,000. Territorial losses 
included those ceded to the Soviet Union after the Winter War and the 
area through which Finland had access to the Arctic Ocean, and a naval 
base close to Helsinki was hired by the Soviet Union (although they 
withdrew from it during the so-called ‘first détente’ in 1955). Finland 
had to pay large war reparations; it also had to put wartime leaders on 
trial. Prison sentences were handed down to eight political leaders, 
including President Risto Ryti and the leading Social Democrat Väinö 
Tanner, but not Marshall Mannerheim, who was Commander-in-Chief 
of the White Army in 1918 and the Finnish Army in the wars of 1939–
45, and president of the Republic in 1944–6. Mannerheim had gained 
status as the most respected national figure, and Stalin obviously took 
this into consideration. 
 The armistice treaty of 1944 opened the way for political changes. The 
Communist Party ceased to be illegal and became a major political 
force, and organizations categorized as fascist or anti-Soviet were 
banned instead. They included the vast paramilitary Civil Guard 
organization that had been built on the basis of the White guards in 
1918 and its sister association, Lotta Svärd, a very important 
organization mobilizing women in the war effort. The Finnish League 
of Companions in Arms was also proscribed. This had been founded in 
1940 after the Winter War to provide social support and assistance to 
soldiers and their families, war invalids, widows and orphans, and to 
control political opinion and broader popular views, especially among 
workers. Several young Social Democrats were active in this 
organization, and after the war many of them became leading figures 
in the Social Democratic Party and in the struggle against Communists 
in the labour movement. 
 
Controversial Legacies: Wartime National Unity or the Post-War 
Political Turn 
 
Significant continuities appeared through wartime and postwar 
political changes and associated social policy orientations. 
Controversial post-war accounts of what had been the most important 
and permanent changes reflected those continuities. The accounts were 
politically influential in post-war Finland, and pointed either to the 
overcoming of Civil War cleavages in the national unity of the wartime 
experience, especially during the Winter War, or to the extension of 
democracy by the political turn after the end of the Continuation War. 
The self-definition of the academic discipline ‘social policy’ was 
shaped by persons active in various wartime social policy initiatives. 
They influentially interpreted wartime problems and solutions as the 
decisive reinforcement of social solidarity and social policy thinking. 
In the view of leading post-war social politicians such as Heikki Waris, 
the first Professor of Social Policy at the University of Helsinki from 
the late 1940s, the so-called January Engagement during the Winter 
War in 1940 was the ‘historically most important’ social policy 
achievement of the wartime period (Waris 1973, 24–5). The January 
Engagement was a considerably short joint declaration, in which the 
national central organizations of trade unions and industrial employers 
promised to negotiate on common issues in the future. Employers were 
now ready to soften their views on trade unions, as it was important to 
convince Nordic and Western opinion that Finland, a democratic 
Nordic country, was the target of Soviet aggression. The practice of 
mutual negotiations was institutionalized by corporatist representation 
in wartime economic regulations. After the Continuation War, at a time 
of rapidly increasing trade union power, this practice was modified into 
the  system of collective labour market agreements, decades later than 
in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. 
Law-based social solidarity was extended through the provision of 
benefits to disabled soldiers and the families of fallen soldiers in the 
form of pensions and support for employment and education. The 
crucial role assigned to voluntary organizations could be seen as 
evidence of reinforced national unity. Close links were established 
between voluntary organizations and governmental authorities at 
central, provincial, and local levels in managing wartime production, 
 
distributing and allocating scarce labour resources, and arranging 
social support. In new national umbrella organizations, working-class 
and bourgeois associations cooperated across political borders (Waris 
1973, 24–6; Urponen 1994, 213–16). 
The wartime legacy of national integration included these home front 
experiences and what was called ‘the spirit of companions in arms’. It 
has been popular to explain later compromises in social and labour 
market policies, for example the pension reform of 1961 and the 
beginning of the so-called incomes policy in 1968, through the shared 
battle experiences and companions-in-arms spirit of the men who now 
met each other as trade union leaders and employers. In terms of 
empirical evidence, this explanation proves to be questionable as it 
bypasses interest-based calculations (Julkunen and Vauhkonen 2006, 
289–319). It is true, nevertheless, that in the municipal policies of many 
cities, in particular, the so-called ‘companions-in-arms axis’ between 
Social Democrats and Conservatives was effective during post-war 
decades. 
In post-war national historical narratives (Kinnunen and Kivimäki 
2012), an unbroken theme has emphasized that wartime efforts and 
sacrifices had preserved the country as unoccupied, independent, 
democratic, Nordic, Western, and neutral, although within the limits of 
a special relationship with the neighbouring Soviet Union. According 
to this account, the armistice treaty heralded a period of injustice and 
danger, but Finland survived the threat of Communism. 
In 1945, the Communists, the Social Democrats, and the Agrarian Party 
formed a coalition government, but this collaboration, and the 
Communist participation in government, only lasted until 1948. Within 
the trade union movement, the Social Democrats were dominant from 
the late 1940s. Nevertheless, with a solid electoral base of around 20 
per cent of the electorate until the 1970s, as well as with their strong 
positions in many trade unions and real and assumed support from the 
Soviet Union, the Communists could be identified as having presented 
a major challenge to national integration (Rainio-Niemi 2008). After 
the 1966 elections in Finland, resulting in a socialist majority in 
parliament, a so-called popular front government was formed, 
consisting of Social Democrats, Communists, and the Centre Party (the 
former Agrarian Party). The Communists became involved in reformist 
politics through coalition governments with the Social Democrats and 
the Centre Party, as well as through cooperation with the Social 
 
Democratic majority in the trade union movement. The process 
resulted in political integration but also in an actual, although not 
formal, split within the Communist Party, between the reformist 
majority and the minority intent on preserving its strong loyalty to the 
Soviet Union and proletarian internationalism. 
However, instead of celebrating and defending wartime national 
solidarity, many critics at the time, as well as later commentators, 
identified the end of the Continuation War in 1944 as the beginning of 
a new democratic era. With varying emphases, such an account was 
shared by the Communists and those Social Democrats and the 
representatives of political centre who had formed the so-called peace 
opposition in the last phases of the Continuation War. This account 
gained widespread popularity, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The new post-war era could not be interpreted as an achievement of 
resistance, because no powerful resistance movement had existed in 
Finland. Nevertheless, one could with good reason argue that, after the 
national unity of the Winter War, significant left-wing political protests 
emerged and that a large machinery of ideological and repressive 
control of opinions was required for maintaining national cohesion in 
the time between the Winter War and the Continuation War, as well as 
during the Continuation War. Not only many Communists but also the 
leaders of the left-wing opposition of the Social Democratic Party 
languished in prison during the Continuation War. In the late 1940s, 
the concept of a ‘Second Republic’ was coined by the advocates of new 
policies. It did not refer to any constitutional change—the constitution 
of 1919 remained untouched—but was meant to point to the post-1944 
changes in foreign policy (notably with regard to relations with the 
Soviet Union) and the widening of democracy, indicated by the 
legitimacy of Communism and the breakthrough of collective 
agreements in labour relations. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, this interpretation, which 
pointed to the positive value of the post-war political changes drawing 
from the lessons of the lost war, was pushed aside. True, historians are 
currently conducting research on wartime control policies, the dark 
side of the collaboration with Nazi Germany, the harsh treatment of 
Soviet prisoners of war, and the practices of ethnic segregation in 
Russian Eastern Karelia (Aunesluoma 2013; Silvennoinen 2013). 
However, in public debates, those representing post-Cold War neo-
patriotic perspectives are influential, arguing in favour of the general 
 
legitimacy, correctness, and necessity of Finnish wartime decisions. 
Such a view also informs the way war veterans are widely respected 
both as a result of the sufferings and horrors they faced and for being 
the most significant actor group in the creation of contemporary 
Finland. 
 
War Veterans and Karelian Evacuees as Social Problems  
 
Many debaters in contemporary Finland regret that in the period before 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, and especially during the period of 
strong left-wing influence in the 1960s and 1970s, war veterans failed 
to achieve the respect they deserved. This claim tends to neglect the 
fact that the generation of war veterans was a powerful force in politics, 
the economy, and culture in the post-war decades, especially in the 
1960s and 1970s, while at the same time facing the protests of a 
younger generation. An important aspect of the formation of the 
welfare state in post-war decades were policies aimed at defining and 
solving the social problems of war veterans and other groups hard hit 
by the war, especially the citizens of the ceded territories. 
Social benefits, assistance, and care targeted at soldiers and their 
families were provided through manifold fragmented practices during 
the war years. These were coordinated at the end of the 1940s by 
legislation on pensions and compensation to disabled soldiers and the 
widows and children of fallen soldiers. The Finnish League of 
Companions in Arms had been banned after the Continuation War, but 
the Disabled War Veterans Association of Finland, founded after the 
Winter War in 1940, was an active initiator and organizer in these 
policy areas. Its effective fundraising campaigns included, for example, 
handling sales of Coca-Cola that was imported to Finland for the 
Helsinki Olympic Games in 1952. 
Two in part rival national war veteran associations were founded in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, and they played an important role in 
bringing war veteran pensions onto the political agenda. Legislation on 
war veteran pensions came into force in 1971, launching a system of 
means-tested pensions. In the following years, pension benefits were 
extended and increased, and since 1982 the war veteran pension system 
has also encompassed the women who had been involved—unarmed—
in warfare-associated tasks, many of them in the Lotta Svärd 
 
Organization banned after the Continuation War. A comprehensive 
system of healthcare and rehabilitation for aging war veterans was 
constructed and maintained by means of public funding, voluntary 
organizations, and popular fund-raising campaigns, strongly 
emphasizing the national ‘debt of honour’ of younger generations to 
war veterans (Sulamaa 2007; Uino 2014). 
The Karelian population of the ceded territories was, after the 1944 
armistice, permanently settled in Finland. Many evacuated families 
faced a massive post-war housing shortage in the cities (Palomäki 
2011; Malinen 2014). However, the dominant policy was to give them 
homesteads in rural municipalities. The right to homesteads was 
extended also to war veterans and war widows and orphans. The huge 
project of settling Karelian people did not proceed without cultural 
friction and conflicts of economic interest. It involved large socio-
economic and cultural changes, but there was also  strong continuity in 
the modes of thought and action concerning national agency and 
integration. 
As late as 1940, about 60 per cent of the Finnish population earned their 
living from agriculture and forestry. The expansion of the rural class of 
small farmers, drawing from the experience of the Civil War of 1918, 
continued to be a major policy of national integration, and was also 
applied to the outcomes of World War II. The number of small-sized 
farms increased until the 1950s. The livelihood of farmers was 
dependent on the linkage between agriculture and wood processing 
industries through peasant-owned forests and, especially, the seasonal 
demand for labour in the logging industry. 
As this linkage weakened through technological development and the 
subsequent diminished need for manpower in forestry, a change in 
socio-economic structures rapidly accelerated in the late 1950s and in 
the 1960s. The Finnish welfare state was built up by efforts to manage 
this very rapid and profound structural change and the simultaneous 
large-scale challenge of the very large baby boom cohorts entering 
schools and the workplace. Reforms to social policy and the 
educational system were an integral part of the establishment of an 
industrialized and urbanized wage-work society. While wartime and 
immediate post-war ideas on national integration had been premised on 
the continuity of rural Finland, wartime ways of defining urgent social 
problems and their solutions now provided elements for the ideational 
and institutional frameworks of these reforms. 
 
 
Population and Individual Capacities as Targets of Rational Planning 
 
World War II enhanced an understanding of a modernizing nation-state 
society in which the objectives of economic rationalization, social 
integration, and individual self-discipline intersected. New and old 
elements were mixed in how such a society was conceived as a target 
of knowledge and reform. Concerns about the quantity and quality of 
population became effective arguments for rational societal planning. 
After the Winter War, in 1941, the Population and Family Welfare 
Federation (Väestöliitto, now the Family Federation of Finland) was 
founded with a strong pronatalist spirit. After World War II, the 
federation, led by a leader of the Agrarian Party, became an active 
promoter of societal planning initiatives (Bergenheim 2017). 
Immediate solutions were needed for urgent problems. Among these 
were initiatives in housing policy, urged by the large number of 
returning soldiers and their families as well as evacuated Karelian 
families. After all, one had to recognize that rural colonization policies 
did not solve housing shortages in urban centres. The institution of 
state-subsided housing loans was legislated by a Social Democratic 
government in 1949 (Malinen 2014). Later, Väestöliitto sought to 
facilitate the education and employment of baby boom cohorts and 
made further efforts to control accelerating socio-economic and 
regional changes by means of science-based planning. 
In wartime, concern about children’s living conditions and malnutrition 
gave rise to a Nordic project, initiated by voluntary organizations and, 
in particular, by the Mannerheim League for Child Welfare (which was 
founded after the victory of the White General in the Civil War of 
1918). The project transferred between 70,000 and 75,000 Finnish 
children to Sweden and, to a lesser extent, to Denmark, where they 
lived with families; the majority of them returned home after the war. 
The experiences of these ‘war children’ are one of the subjects of the 
current debate on the long-term mental consequences of war in Finland 
(Korppi-Tommola 2008, 445– 55). Concern about children’s well-
being and the nation’s vitality also resulted, for example, in a 
parliamentary decision in 1943 that all primary schools must provide a 
free lunch to children (although the municipalities had five years within 
 
which to implement this decision). A bill on cash support to poor 
families with many children was passed in 1943. 
Women’s associations played a significant role in initiating and 
implementing wartime population and family policies. Many of their 
leading figures advocated urban, middle-class family ideals, but with 
limited success. In a rural society such as Finland, the gender division 
of labour never followed male-breadwinner ideals, and women—even 
married women—had also worked in manufacturing industries. The 
role of female labour power nevertheless increased significantly in all 
sectors of the economy during the course of the war. This change in the 
gender division of labour was only in part a temporary wartime 
phenomenon. The participation of women in industrial working life 
was supported by the fact that the shortage of labour power continued 
until the end of the 1940s, instead of the large-scale unemployment that 
had been expected to arise after the return of men from the front. True, 
the ideological impulses of wartime experiences were controversial. 
An ideal of family as a basic unit of society was actually reinforced by 
taxation, as later appears. A male-breadwinner model was advocated 
by both wartime and post-war proposals of family allowances as a part 
of a wage settlement. However, these proposals were soon rejected, and 
in 1948, at the same time as in other Nordic countries, child allowances 
began to be paid to all mothers. This was the first universal social 
benefit in Finland (Bergholm 2013, 315–19). 
The quantity and quality of population as a target of knowledge and 
politics was interlinked with the issue of how best to fit individuals into 
the functions of society. This was an urgent problem on the wartime 
national agenda of politics and administration. Jobs became classified 
according to the amount of food and calories needed and people 
became categorized according to their occupational skills and political 
reliability. A classification of medical practices was needed in the 
treatment and employment of disabled soldiers, and the development 
of psychiatric methods was fostered by the need to somehow recognize 
the most acute and obvious forms of psychological damage. In the 
Continuation War, about 17,000 ‘shaken-up’ soldiers were taken into 
psychiatric care and treated with new methods such as electrical and 
insulin shock treatment; yet, after the war, these individuals mostly 
failed to be recognized and classified as war invalids entitled to social 
support (Kivimäki 2013). 
 
Wartime experiences inspired institutional novelties in improving the 
quality of population and individual capacities. This was obvious in the 
foundation of the Institute of Occupational Health (Työterveyslaitos). 
The decision to set up this institute was made in 1945 and it was fully 
operational from 1951. The institute was initiated by young doctors and 
organized through the cooperation of governmental authorities, 
employer organizations, and trade unions. In the activities of the 
institute, the knowledge of physicians, engineers, and psychologists 
was combined. Models came not only from Sweden but also from the 
United States. The American pragmatist orientation inspired an attempt 
to combine different fields of scientific knowledge in seeking solutions 
to working-life problems. The Rockefeller Foundation gave significant 
economic support to the institute (Kettunen 1994, 378–92). 
The promotion of economic efficiency, or a ‘rationalization 
movement’, had been discussed in Finland since the import of scientific 
management ideas prior to World War I. Although Finland was only 
indirectly involved in that war, linkages to the war economy of the 
Russian Empire provided some incentives for similar efforts to foster a 
more rational organization of urgent economic activities in a manner 
characteristic of the countries participating more fully in the conflict 
(Devinat 1927). 
During World War II, rationalization was quite explicitly declared as a 
joint national task and necessity. To introduce and implement time and 
motion studies, the main method of Taylorism, a special office was 
founded in connection with the army headquarters. The German 
rationalization movement had inspired Finnish engineers since the 
early 1920s, and lessons were adopted from Germany during wartime 
as well. For many advocates of rationalization, the German mode was 
orientated to the common good of the people and the nation, and had 
thus a better ‘spirit’ than similar developments in America, where the 
interests of private companies were seen as being too dominant. Such 
a view was not always associated with sympathy towards the Nazi 
regime. Yet it was clear that the trade union leaders who were involved 
in wartime rationalization efforts did not look to German models of 
labour relations, but wished instead to associate British and Swedish 
ideas of industrial and economic democracy with rationalization 
(Kettunen 2001a, 235–55). 
American management techniques were eagerly adopted in post-war 
employer policies of industrial companies. Finland did not join the 
 
Marshall Plan as the Soviet Union was opposed. However, Western, 
and especially American, connections played an important role. They 
were important not only in terms of international post-war social aid, 
but also for the ideological and practical flavour they gave to the way 
in which social problems were defined as targets of science-based 
knowledge. This was evident in the Institute of Occupational Health 
and also in the Institute of Industrial Supervisor Training (Teollisuuden 
Työnjohto-opisto, now the Management Institute of Finland) that was 
founded by employer organizations in 1945 for the defence of capitalist 
society. Courses of the American programme ‘The Training Within 
Industry’ were adopted in the late 1940s as part of the curriculum of 
the institute (Kettunen 1994, 355–61). More generally, American ideas 
of management became, in various ways, connected with the efforts of 
science-based societal planning, mixed with conclusions drawn from 
wartime experiences. 
 
The State as an Agent of Rational Planning 
 
In attempts to respond to immediate wartime needs, the ethos of 
economic and societal rationalization was reinforced in a way that 
combined different ideational ingredients from abroad with a notion of 
a national community as an agent defining and solving its own 
problems. This also implied a reinforced legitimacy of the state as an 
economic actor, regulator, redistributor, and provider. 
Wartime rationalization efforts had been, on the one hand, focused on 
the acute tasks of exceptional circumstances, such as the management 
of hugely increased railway transportation, the reorganization of 
industrial production for military needs, and the erection of defensive 
fortifications, all of this by means of scarce and largely unskilled 
labour. These efforts were entwined with a greatly reinforced role of 
government in the national economy. 
Annual state expenditure in the years 1940 to 1944 was about three 
times as high it had been in 1938. Military spending had increased in 
the 1930s and was in 1938 more than 20 per cent of state expenditure. 
In 1940, the proportion of military spending exceeded 80 per cent 
(Lehtinen 1967; Eloranta and Tanaka 2015). The increased spending 
was covered by several forms of revenue enhancement. In 1938, the 
government responded to the danger of war by raising income and 
 
property taxes by 20 per cent for military preparations, and additional 
increases as well as new forms of taxation were introduced during the 
wars (Jäntti 2006; Linnakangas 2015). A part of spending was covered 
by loans, about three quarters of which were domestic, and by printing 
notes (Lehtinen 1967). 
On the other hand, the ethos of rationalization as a vital national task 
also linked together earlier international Great Depression conclusions 
concerning the need for national coordination of private economic 
action, or the ‘rationalisation of rationalisation’ as the ILO put it 
(International Labour Office 1931, 376), and wartime international 
ideas of ‘post-war planning’. According to a widely shared view, 
increased state intervention implied a permanent shift in priorities and 
would only in part be removed after the war (Teräs 2013, 189–214). 
In Finnish wartime debates, the New Deal, the Beveridge Plan, and 
Nazi social policies were all referred to as evidence of the new active 
role of the state in the future post-war world. After the war, the 
definition of national necessities and the content of state intervention 
clearly became a matter of political controversy. Yet even the 
Communists shared much of the mode of thought emphasizing 
economic rationalization as an urgent national task, not least due to 
their view that reparations to the Soviet Union—a crucial economic 
necessity for Finland until 1952—were an anti-fascist and democratic 
national duty. Both the Communists and the Social Democrats 
interpreted their quite divergent socialist goals as a transition to true 
national economic rationality. 
In reforms of taxation, responses to immediate wartime needs also 
implied long-term changes (Linnakangas 2015). Turnover tax was 
introduced in 1941. The collection of income tax was made more 
effective in 1943 by adopting a pay-as-you-earn system in which the 
employer withholds the tax. The administration of state and municipal 
taxation was reformed. The law on progressive income and property 
tax was revised in 1943. 
One of the long-term changes proved to be a return to the joint taxation 
of spouses in 1943 legislation. In 1935, separate income taxation had 
been introduced, motivated by the marriage law of 1929 that prescribed 
the independence of wives in economic terms, but also by efforts to 
oppose the moral threat of unmarried cohabitation (Karppi 2008). In 
the return to joint taxation in 1943, fiscal calculations played a role, but 
it also reflected an ideal of the married couple as an economic unit, 
 
with the husband as the dominant partner. One interpretation of this is 
that the pattern of rural households had gained still more ideological 
power through the wartime subordination of individuals to joint effort, 
yet the return to joint taxation was paradoxical given the fact that the 
employment of married women in waged work had significantly 
increased in wartime. In 1976, separate taxation was again introduced, 
now in the Nordic wave of similar reforms and as an aspect of what 
Lars Trägårdh (1997) calls ‘statist individualism’ in the making of the 
Nordic welfare state. 
 
National Necessities in the Post-War Making of the Welfare State 
 
The immediate post-war period ended in the early 1950s, when 
reparations to the Soviet Union (mostly in the form of products of 
engineering industries that were largely extended) had been completed 
and the comprehensive system of rationing was dissolved. Now a more 
or less articulated national strategy of prosperity was widely adopted. 
It was based on a high rate of investment and the hope and assumption 
that sacrifices in the form of a more moderate growth of consumption 
would result in general prosperity in the future (Pohjola 1994, 237). A 
traditional mode of thought and action was reinforced in which social 
policies were assessed from the point of view of the limits imposed by 
economic resources. 
A divergent argument, pointing to a virtuous circle between expanding 
social policies and economic growth, also emerged. It is evident in 
Pekka Kuusi’s (1961) book on social policy for the 1960s, often 
characterized as the plan of the Finnish welfare state. Promoting social 
equality through the redistribution of income, social security and 
labour power policy would release people’s productive capacities; the 
vicious circle between poverty and passivity would be broken. 
Nevertheless, in Kuusi’s narrative, there was also a strong emphasis on 
national necessities. This derived from Finland’s place in the world of 
international competition between national societies. Finland was 
situated between two highly dynamic and growth-oriented societies: 
Sweden and the Soviet Union. The mission Kuusi outlined was indeed 
a matter of life and death: if Finland was to survive between these two 
societies, ‘we ourselves are doomed to grow’ (Kuusi 1964, 59). 
 
Kuusi was not advocating any third way between the societal systems 
of Sweden and the Soviet Union. His argument was, rather, an example 
of the Finnish tendency to avoid any explicit association of social 
policy with Cold War confrontation. He located social policy in the 
sphere above—or beneath—the political and inter-systemic 
confrontations between East and West, in which the basic process was 
the evolution and growth of industrial society, with Sweden and the 
Soviet Union variously exemplifying the emergence of such a society. 
This implicit convergence ideology had obvious advantages for the 
national(istic) legitimization of social policies in the Cold War era. 
Cold War inter-systemic confrontation was a significant factor behind 
socio-political considerations. Relatively strong support for 
Communism, in particular, was a major concern for all those who 
believed in social policies as a means of national social cohesion, and 
even for the political right, most notably the National Coalition Party, 
an actively anti-social policy stance was not a viable alternative 
(Smolander 2000). However, while the Swedish Social Democrats had 
integrated their policy objectives in ‘democratic welfare politics’ and 
contrasted it to capitalism and communism (Edling 2013), in Finland 
the dominant orientation was to depoliticize social policies. Thus, 
social reforms were often discussed as functional needs, pragmatic 
steps along the road of general progress within the limits of economic 
resources, or as issues of the pragmatic adjustment of conflicting 
interests in the name of the common national interest. 
 The left-wing majority governments of the period 1966–70 have 
remained in the history books as the ones that set the broad parameters 
of the welfare state in Finland into motion. Indeed, one may say that in 
the late 1960s the willingness to compromise reached a point where it 
became possible to gain broad political support for major Nordic-type 
reforms in social and educational policies as well as in industrial 
relations. However, the welfare state was no ‘project’ in Finland before 
it became, in the 1980s and 1990s, an achievement to be defended. 
The concept of welfare state did not play any central role in how the 
socialist parties expressed their goals (Kettunen 2014). Moreover, 
important reforms of pension systems, sickness insurance, and 
unemployment policies had already been made in 1955–65, a period of 
great parliamentary instability (Bergholm 2009), and all of these social 
security reforms were achieved through political competition, interest 
conflicts, and compromises within the limits of what were conceived 
 
of as national economic and political necessities. These necessities 
were in the 1950s and 1960s associated with a profound socio-
economic and regional change that was preconditioned by the previous 
path-dependent way of dealing with the outcomes of war. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For an historical interpretation of the legacies of wars in the making of 
the Finnish welfare state, it is useful to pay attention to the combination 
of interest conflicts, on the one hand, and the emphasis on external 
necessities to be responded to by internal national will, on the other. 
It is easy to find evidence for a conflict-laden past in Finland. The Civil 
War of 1918, with its class-based preconditions, had long-term effects 
through social memory and political institutions. In the post-World 
War II era, the relatively strong support of the Communists was one of 
the political phenomena that made Finland exceptional in the Nordic 
context. In industrial relations, obvious ‘low-trust’ elements remained 
until the 1980s, indicated by comparative strike statistics. The 
parliamentary system was unstable and short-lived governments were 
typical of Finland until the early 1980s. 
However, an argument suggesting that, in Finland, there was a special 
emphasis on national consensus can easily be supported by referring to 
the historical record, as well. One may refer to the remarkable national 
unity during World War II, especially during the Winter War, with its 
long-term ideological legacy. During the Cold War, the political 
agenda and political agency were shaped by the necessity of coping 
with the tight limits for manoeuvre in international politics. Many 
economists and sociologists have also pointed out the special capability 
of the Finnish export industry to acquire hegemonic power through 
presenting its particular interests (international competitiveness) as the 
general national interest (e.g. Pekkarinen 1992; Kosonen 1993). 
Arguably, the Finland of too much conflict and the Finland of too much 
consensus preconditioned each other (Kettunen 2004). The ideal of 
national consensus developed in the nineteenth-century nation-
building that took place in the former Eastern provinces of the Swedish 
realm, after the Russo-Swedish war in 1808–9, within the framework 
of the Russian Empire. The strong consensus ideal tended to shape 
political conflicts into struggles about the right way and the privilege 
 
of speaking in the name of the whole, ‘the people’. This kind of 
struggle can also be found as a significant aspect of the Civil War. 
In the early 1960s, the sociologist Erik Allardt distinguished between 
four ‘basic cleavages’ of the Finnish society. They existed between the 
Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking Finns, between rural and 
urban Finns, between the working class and the bourgeoisie, and 
between the Communists and the rest of the people (Allardt 1964, 97–
131). One might argue that the political significance of these cleavages 
stemmed from their historical anchorage in rival claims of speaking in 
the name of ‘the people’ or the ‘will of people’. Allardt observed that 
steps had been taken to recognize and regulate these cleavages and thus 
reinforce national integration. One should proceed in this direction, 
especially in relation to Communists. In the Durkheimian spirit, and 
inspired by the class conflict theory of Ralf Dahrendorf, Allardt 
concluded that, in a modern society with a deepening division of 
labour, social integration could only be reinforced by diminishing the 
pressure for conformity. Conflicts, when recognized and thus 
institutionalized, would promote integration and improve the 
performance capacity of the society. 
This novel idea of national integration was seen as a way of 
overcoming the conflicts nourished by a strong demand for national 
consensus. However, as Risto Alapuro argues, it was actually 
compatible with another older feature of Finnish political culture, ‘a 
curious combination of the demand for unanimity and the toleration of 
disagreement’ (1997, 196). World War II experiences had reinforced 
this combination. 
Wartime experiences fostered the notion of society as a functional 
whole that must and can be steered and rationalized by means of 
scientific knowledge. These experiences also created prerequisites for 
a problem definition focusing on how to fit different individuals into 
different functions of society. However, in addition to the level of large 
society and the level of different individuals, there was also a third level 
that was recognized as a target of problem-solving knowledge. It was 
found between society and the individual, a social sphere that could not 
be reduced to the norms and institutions of the societal system nor to 
the properties of individual people. This was discussed in sociological 
studies of the 1940s and 1950s concerning conflicts between official 
and unofficial norms and about the group dynamic as a force with its 
own autonomous laws, a phenomenon recognized in soldiers’ 
 
collective behaviour in army units and later in post-war industrial 
working life (Kettunen 1997, 163–5). 
One of the most influential treatments was that given by Väinö Linna 
in his novel The Unknown Soldier (1954). Linna’s novel and 
sociological studies implied that disobedience and conflicts between 
official and unofficial norms were characteristic of Finnish culture and, 
moreover, that they could have a positive impact on the operations of 
an organization. 
This line of argument re-emerged with new strength in 1960s 
sociological and sociologically inspired political discourse. By 
recognizing conflicts and institutionalizing them, it was suggested, the 
efficiency and cohesion of society could be improved. This argument 
achieved considerable influence in the politics of social policy, but it 
was still connected with the framing idea of the nation-state society as 
an historical agent that responds to external threats by means of its 
internal will and capacity. 
Different historical layers can be found in the legacies of wars, and they 
seem to actualize in different phases of welfare-state history. Currently, 
the welfare state is modified to fulfil competition–state functions in a 
globalized economy, and that being so, the usefulness of conflicts is 
hardly a popular argument. The national ‘we’ appears as the creator of 
the welfare state in Finnish public discourse. Such a consensual belief 
seems to be more widely shared in Finland than in other Nordic 
countries, especially in Sweden, where a real struggle is going on 
between the Social Democrats and the bourgeois parties regarding 
ownership of the history of the welfare state (Kettunen et al. 2015, 86–
7). Ideological associations to wartime joint efforts are evoked, for 
example, by the Finnish word talkoot, meaning that the members of the 
community voluntarily, out of an internal sense of duty, cooperate to 
fulfil an urgent task. This rural word was in constant use in the 
organization of home front activities during World War II, and remains 
popular in current political rhetoric. The need of national talkoot for 
rescuing the welfare state is a favourite phrase in advocating for 
austerity politics, consensual corporatism, improved competitiveness, 
and many other objectives. 
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